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JUST ENOUGH
Lee Anne Fennell*
Response to: Brian Angelo Lee, Just Undercompensation: The Idiosyncratic
Premium in Eminent Domain, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 593 (2013).
Does the constitutional measure of just compensation—fair market
value—unfairly undercompensate those whose property is taken through
eminent domain? The question is trickier than it appears, as Professor Brian
Angelo Lee artfully demonstrates. First, there is the positive question of which
elements, if any, are actually left out of the fair market value standard. Next,
there is the normative question of whether failure to compensate for those
elements should be regarded as unfair. A third question is how, or if, any such
unfairness should be addressed. In this Response I hope to both underscore the
value of the questions Lee asks and challenge some of his answers. One thing
is clear: Lee has opened up understudied avenues of inquiry that will richly
repay the attention of those interested in questions of property rights and
government power.
This Response proceeds in two Parts. Part I takes up Lee’s first
question—the contents of fair market value. My analysis, like Lee’s, focuses
throughout on owner-occupied homes, which are traditionally assumed to be
significant repositories of subjective value.1 Part II considers whether fair
market value is a sufficiently just measure of compensation—and if not, how
we might make it so.

* Max Pam Professor of Law and Herbert and Marjorie Fried Research Scholar, University of
Chicago Law School. I thank Saul Levmore, Eduardo Peñalver, and Lior Strahilevitz for helpful
comments, and the Stuart C. and JoAnn Nathan Faculty Fund for financial support.
1. See Brian Angelo Lee, Just Undercompensation: The Idiosyncratic Premium in Eminent
Domain, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 593, 613 n.71 (2013) (suggesting sentimental value is likely to be
greater, on average, for residential owners than for business owners).

109

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2341453

110

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW SIDEBAR

[Vol. 113:109

I. UNPACKING FAIR MARKET VALUE
Lee usefully tries to pin down what, if anything, the fair market value
(FMV) measure of compensation leaves uncompensated.2 This is an important
exercise. FMV is the constitutional standard for just compensation,3 even
though owners of condemned land often receive larger amounts.4 And FMV is
generally believed to undercompensate.5 If this supposition is untrue, then it
weakens many of the concerns associated with the use of eminent domain.6
Like other scholars, I have previously observed that the FMV measure of
compensation leaves an increment of value uncompensated:
The uncompensated increment is made up of three distinct
components: (1) the increment by which the property owner’s
subjective value exceeds fair market value; (2) the chance of reaping
a surplus from trade (that is, of obtaining an amount larger than one’s
own true subjective valuation); and (3) the autonomy of choosing for
oneself when to sell.7
Lee argues that appropriate amounts of both subjective value and the
chance of gains from trade are included in FMV, leaving only interference with
autonomy categorically uncompensated in a manner that would implicate
fairness concerns.8 This Part focuses only on the positive question of what does

2. See id. at 598–618.
3. See, e.g., United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979).
4. See, e.g., Yun-chien Chang, An Empirical Study of Court-Adjudicated Takings Compensation
in New York City: 1990–2003, 8 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 384, 400 (2011) (comparing results of
hedonic regression models with court-adjudicated compensation in New York City eminent
domain cases and finding, “Overall, the claims, offers, and awards tend to be higher than the
estimated fair market value.”); Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of
Eminent Domain, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 101, 121–26 (2006) (detailing federal and state relocation
assistance statutes that entitle condemnees to amounts significantly above fair market value); id.
at 126–36 (discussing role of precondemnation bargaining in providing takees with above-market
amounts of compensation).
5. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 74 (8th ed. 2011) (“[J]ust
compensation in the legal sense is not full compensation in the economic sense.”).
6. The concerns associated with undercompensation in eminent domain sound in both fairness
and efficiency. Fairness arguments center on the fear that condemnees will be forced to bear
disproportionate burdens. Efficiency arguments focus on the fear that the government will take
too much property (or the wrong property) if it is not required to fully compensate for what it
takes. For an overview (and some counterarguments), see, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Taking
Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 957, 961–62 & nn.15–16 (2004) [hereinafter
Fennell, Taking].
7. Id. at 958–59 (footnotes omitted). Other scholars have recognized these elements in various
forms. See, e.g., Garnett, supra note 4, at 109–10 (discussing “dignitary harms” that connect to
autonomy concerns); James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, Public Ruses, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev.
859, 866 (2004) (noting “consumer surplus” that residents may have in their properties); Thomas
W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 61, 83 (1986) (observing owners
may place “subjective premium[s]” on their properties above fair market value); Katrina Miriam
Wyman, The Measure of Just Compensation, 41 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 239, 260 (2007) (discussing
how eminent domain deprives takees of opportunities to bargain for shares of surplus from
economic development projects).
8. Lee does express some ambivalence about the treatment of high levels of sentimental value
under the FMV standard, although he argues that ordinary or typical amounts of this element are
included in the measure. See Lee, supra note 1, at 597, 633–34 & n.125, 648–49 (leaving open
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and does not get included in FMV, leaving the normative questions to the next
Part. Part I.A considers subjective value and Part I.B turns to the last two
components of the “uncompensated increment.”9
A. The Subjective Increment
Lee contends that the FMV measure of compensation incorporates a
“typical” amount of subjective value and omits only the subset of subjective
value that is “idiosyncratically large.”10 He is clearly right to observe that
many of the things that are subjectively valued by a home’s current owner are
things that most potential future owners would also subjectively value—such
as a convenient location, a weatherproof roof, a beautiful view, a gorgeously
landscaped lawn, and so on. We would expect such widely correlated
components of value to get picked up in sales transactions over time, and
hence to be built into FMV.11 Even though a seller’s entire reservation price
might be accurately called her “subjective valuation” of the property,12 eminent
domain scholars recognize (implicitly or explicitly) that the widely correlated
portions of that valuation are not in fact excluded from FMV.13 Instead, only a
subjective “increment” or “premium” remains uncompensated by the FMV
measure.14
The interesting empirical question, which Lee approaches conceptually, is
whether some of the elements usually believed to be within the uncompensated
possibility that fairness could require fixed-dollar-amount compensation for idiosyncratically
large sentimental values).
9. My organization diverges slightly from Lee’s taxonomy, in that he includes the chance of
gains from trade and autonomy as subcomponents of subjective value, rather than as separate
elements. See id. at 607.
10. Id. at 611 (emphasis omitted).
11. As Lee explains, there is more than one method for deriving FMV. Id. at 616–18. However,
the comparable sales method is widely used and often preferred by courts. Id. at 616.
12. A reservation price is the smallest amount an owner would accept to sell an item, or the
largest amount a buyer would pay to purchase it. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, A Positive Theory
of Legal Negotiation, 88 Geo. L.J. 1789, 1792 (2000). A seller’s reservation price for a given
property reflects the sum total of what the property is worth to her, and hence might be equated
with her subjective valuation of the property, subject to two clarifications. First, her reservation
price will tend to align with FMV even if she herself has no affection or use for the property, as
long as she will have outside opportunities to sell at that price to other buyers. Second, as
discussed in the text, only a subset of the things that she subjectively values about the property
will fail to correlate with what the market as a whole values about the property.
13. Thus, the fact that an owner might subjectively feel aesthetic delight when observing her own
granite countertops does not keep this element of value from being reflected in FMV as long as
enough would-be buyers feel a similar sense of delight when exposed to granite countertops. By
contrast, the happy feeling an owner gets when observing his buckling do-it-yourself countertops
covered in an unpopular color of linoleum is unlikely to be (positively) correlated with anyone
else’s feelings toward those countertops.
14. See Fennell, Taking, supra note 6, at 958 (referring to “increment by which the property
owner’s subjective value exceeds fair market value”); Merrill, supra note 7, at 83 (using term
“subjective premium” to capture difference between FMV and owner’s subjective valuation). It is
of course tautologically true, as Lee notes, that compensation pegged to FMV will not
compensate for an increment or premium that is defined to represent an amount in excess of
FMV. Lee, supra note 1, at 600. Lee properly focuses attention on the contents of this increment
or premium.
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portion of subjective value are actually incorporated into FMV. For example, it
is generally supposed that sentimental attachments to the home (happy
memories and so forth) are not built into FMV because they are unique to the
owner and not transferable to a buyer. Lee argues that a “typical” amount of
even the most sentimental elements of the subjective increment will in fact get
captured in FMV, on the theory that large numbers of sellers share the fact of
these elements (if not their specific details). Thus, Lee posits, sellers as a rule
will only part with property after being compensated for a normal amount of
lost sentimental value (as well as for other commonly incurred costs, like
moving expenses, making new friends, learning one’s way around a new
neighborhood, and so on).15
This line of reasoning is provocative and well worth exploring. However,
there is reason to doubt that typical amounts of sentimental value and other
individualized costs wind up in FMV. As Lee recognizes, those who sell are
not randomly selected from the population of owners, but rather are selfselected in ways that are likely to correlate with lower-than-average subjective
premiums. Despite the attention that subjective value gets in the eminent
domain context, homeowners do not always maintain a stably high level of
positive attachment to their homes. Not only may subjective valuations in
property grow over time,16 but dramatic downward shifts may occur due to
changes in employment, household configuration, health, and other factors.17
People who have experienced these downward shifts are likely to be
overrepresented among sellers, along with those who never formed strong
attachments to the home in the first place.
Also overrepresented among sellers are those who have experienced a
“pull” factor that overrides their attachment to their existing home, such as a
new job offer in another place, a desire to move in with a partner, or a chance
to get a child into a better school district.18 What is significant about such

15. Lee, supra note 1, at 610–14.
16. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines
as Land Use Controls, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 681, 736 (1973) (observing “long-occupied singlefamily homes in stable residential areas tend to attract increasing subjective valuations as the
tenure of ownership increases”). Causation likely goes in both directions, with deepening
attachments tending to lengthen the stay, even as longer stays lead (on average) to deeper
attachments.
17. Downward shifts in subjective valuation need not be associated with negative life events. For
example, a commuting location that is ideal for a job in downtown Cleveland will be a very poor
commuting location for a new job in Chicago. Likewise, a trendy but edgy neighborhood may
lose some of its appeal after one has children. The fact that fluctuations in subjective valuation
can go in both directions explains why owners tend to place a high value on holding the
“possessory option” to stay or leave at a time of their own choosing. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell,
Possession Puzzles, in 11-1 Powell on Real Property WFL10-1, WFL10-4 to WFL10-8 (Michael
Allan Wolf ed., 2010).
18. Census data on reasons for moves indicate that nearly half of all moves in the United States
occur for either job-related reasons or family-related reasons. U.S. Census Bureau, Table 25:
Reason for Move, by Sex, Age, Race and Hispanic Origin, Relationship to Householder,
Educational Attainment, Marital Status, Nativity, Tenure, Poverty Status, and Type of Move
(Collapsed Categories): 2011 to 2012 (2012), http://www.census.gov/hhes/migration/files/cps/cps
2012/tab25-1.xls (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Most of the balance are due to
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factors is their capacity to effectively introduce side payments or subsidies
(pecuniary or not) from outside the four corners of the home sale itself. Such
subsidies can turn the transaction into a positive expected value proposition
even if existing subjective attachments are not fully compensated by the sales
price. The interaction of the relevant labor markets, relationship markets, and
housing markets will determine exactly how things play out in a given
instance. But one thing is clear: Not every inducement for a given move must
inevitably come from the pocketbook of the buyer or show up in the sales
price.
Lee’s response to the self-selection argument is that those who do not sell
also influence FMV. Owners with high subjective valuations who sit on the
sidelines put upward pressure on prices, Lee argues, ensuring that some of
their subjective value gets built into FMV as well.19 Lee is correct to observe
that the presence or absence of competitors in the marketplace (on either the
buying or selling side) will influence prices. But tracing the mechanism
through which this influence occurs leads to somewhat different conclusions
than the ones Lee reaches.
Suppose there are two identical houses whose owners value them at
$200,000 and $300,000, respectively. If there are two would-be buyers who
each value these homes at $250,000, they will bid up the price of the lowvaluing owner’s home to epsilon below $250,000. One buyer will win the bid,
and the other will walk away empty-handed. The buyer in this story is forced
to the top of the bargaining range not by the subjective valuation of the
nonseller, but rather by the fact that demand for homes under $250,000
outstrips supply in this housing market.20 The outcome will not change if the
high-valuing owner places a subjective value on her home of $3 million
instead of $300,000. Owners with high subjective valuations may contribute to
housing scarcity—a point pursued further below—but their valuations do not
automatically work their way into home prices.
It is true, as Lee’s examples show, that potential sellers whose reservation
prices lie below those of some potential buyers can influence bargaining
dynamics without actually becoming sellers themselves—if supply exceeds
demand.21 To adapt my example above, suppose there is just one buyer with a
valuation of $250,000, and the two sellers have reservation prices of $200,000
“housing-related reasons.” Id. Both push and pull factors are likely to feature in each of these
categories.
19. See Lee, supra note 1, at 627–29 (positing that higher reservation prices held by those who
are not actively seeking to sell will place upward pressure on negotiated prices); id. at 628 n.115
(asserting “fair market value for a given piece of property will incorporate not only information
about the subjective values of voluntary sellers of similar properties but information about the
subjective values of nonsellers as well”).
20. The example in the text implicitly assumes that the demand for owner-occupied housing is
not completely price-inelastic, and that a would-be buyer could walk away (perhaps to double up
with family, perhaps to rent, perhaps to obtain housing in a different housing market) rather than
meet the reservation price of a high valuer.
21. The nonseller in my example had a reservation price above that of both buyers. Lee uses
examples in which the nonseller has a reservation price lower than a buyer’s reservation price but
higher than the reservation price of the party who will end up being the seller. Lee, supra note 1,
at 628.
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and $225,000, respectively. Here, the buyer can force the lower-valuing seller
to the bottom half of the bargaining range by threatening to buy from the
higher valuer instead.22 But “near sellers” who provide negotiating leverage to
buyers are not drawn at random from the population of homeowners either;
rather, they are the owners who have the lowest valuations among those who
do not end up selling. Their influence does not undermine the core idea that
owners with relatively low subjective valuations determine FMV.
More interesting is the potential for high subjective valuers to contribute
to a “seller’s market” in which the relative scarcity of homes under conditions
of high demand allows sellers to glean a disproportionately large share of
surplus. The relationship between high-valuing nonsellers and housing scarcity
is not straightforward. For one thing, nonsellers often do more than keep
competing homes off the market—they also keep competing homebuyers (i.e.,
themselves) off the market as well. Moreover, we would not expect a seller’s
market to persist for long unless there were impediments to supply. Lee
focuses on factors that keep existing owner-occupied homes off the market: the
fixed costs of moving, the difficulty of learning about market prices, and
widespread sentimental attachments to property.23 But there are other sources
of housing supply: the conversion of rental units into owner-occupied units,
and new home construction.24 Homes from these sources are, by definition,
unencumbered by any sentimental value or special suitability to their sellers,
and hence might be expected to limit any seller’s ability to charge a premium
for giving up such advantages.
In thinking through these points, it is helpful to consider another type of
nonfungible property that Lee mentions, citing Margaret Jane Radin: wedding
rings.25 Although Lee does not address the question, it would be odd to expect
a “typical” amount of the subjective value that spouses hold in wedding rings
to be reflected in the secondhand ring market. The reasons for this intuition
track the points above. First, those who sell used wedding rings probably
attach an atypically low sentimental value to the rings compared with the
overall run of wedding ring owners. Sellers of wedding rings may include
some devoted spouses who simply must raise cash quickly, but the secondhand
market is likely dominated by those who have experienced breakups that have
drained the ring of its sentimental value altogether, and possibly even flipped
its emotional valence. Second, even if starry-eyed sellers of used wedding
rings did not have to compete against the disillusioned, they would still have to
compete against sellers in the new wedding ring market.
Of course, there is a striking difference between the ring market and the
housing market: The supply of rings can easily rise to meet demand, whereas
the supply of homes generally cannot. The addition of new housing stock is
22. Of course, if we add another buyer or two to the story, our erstwhile nonseller becomes a
seller.
23. See Lee, supra note 1, at 626–29.
24. Although Lee explains that one metric of FMV is keyed to rebuilding costs, id. at 617, he
does not connect this fact to the potential for new housing stock to compete with existing housing
stock.
25. See id. at 604 (citing and discussing Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stan.
L. Rev. 957 (1982)).
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heavily regulated through zoning and other land use restrictions,26 and the
conversion of rental units may also be constrained.27 Such constraints on
supply can artificially sustain elevated home prices as demand increases.28
Meanwhile, many owner-occupants may remain on the sidelines, in part to
avoid having to compete for new housing under the same constrained market
conditions. Rising prices may also limit the entry of current homeowners for a
reason unrelated to personal attachments—if owners anticipate that prices will
continue to rise, they may find the option value of hanging onto the home
increasingly valuable.29
Recognizing these facts changes the meaning of Lee’s argument about
nonsellers. Large numbers of nonsellers with high subjective values could help
to sustain a seller’s market when demand is rising and there are binding limits
on housing supply. However, this is not because the market is taking
nonsellers’ subjective valuations into account; rather, it is taking the raw fact
of housing scarcity into account. Legal restrictions on supply, along with any
other factor that keeps competing sellers from entering a tight housing market,
will tend to improve the bargaining position of those who sell, pushing up
prices and FMV accordingly. This could make it more likely that FMV will
approach or even exceed the reservation price of a randomly condemned
owner—depending on the reason the owner stayed on the sidelines as prices
rose.30

26. See William A. Fischel, Political Structure and Exclusionary Zoning: Are Small Suburbs the
Big Problem?, in Fiscal Decentralization and Land Policies 111, 114 (Gregory K. Ingram & YuHung Hong eds., 2008) (using measure of housing supply elasticity to measure regulatory
restrictiveness). See generally Edward L. Glaeser et al., Why Is Manhattan So Expensive?
Regulation and the Rise in Housing Prices, 48 J.L. & Econ. 331 (2005) (empirically investigating
gap between construction costs and condominium prices in Manhattan).
27. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 Phil. & Pub. Affairs 350, 372
(1986) (“Common companions of rent control are condominium-conversion control and
demolition control.”).
28. The fact that construction of new housing stock takes time (even in the absence of land use
restrictions) can also keep supply from rising nimbly in response to increased demand. There may
also be some natural or physical limits on suitable land for building. But see Fischel, supra note
26, at 114 (“[N]atural constraints on supply such as wetlands and steep slopes are seldom by
themselves enough to deter a developer.”). Stickiness of supply may be even more important in
sustaining a buyer’s market in areas of falling demand for homes. Existing housing stock is
durable and typically removed very slowly. See Richard K. Green, Stephen Malpezzi & Stephen
K. Mayo, Metropolitan-Specific Estimates of the Price Elasticity of Supply of Housing, and Their
Sources, 95 Am. Econ. Rev. 334, 334 (2005).
29. For work on a similar phenomenon, see generally Stephen Day Cauley & Andrey D. Pavlov,
Rational Delays: The Case of Real Estate, 24 J. Real Est. Fin. & Econ. 143 (2002) (examining
rationality of holding onto real estate in down markets for option value associated with potential
market recovery).
30. If she simply failed to notice that prices were rising, or noticed the rising prices but had not
yet had an opportunity to put her own home on the market, her reservation price may have been
surpassed. See Lee, supra note 1, at 626–27. On the other hand, if she must buy new housing in
the same overheated market, her own valuation will rise along with housing prices, making it less
likely that FMV will approach her reservation price.
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B. Other Uncompensated Elements
Although the claim that eminent domain undercompensates owners has
been largely based on subjective value, two other elements have been
recognized in the literature as well: the opportunity to capture gains from trade,
and the autonomy-based or “dignitary”31 interest associated with being able to
choose when to sell.
1. Gains from Trade. — Surplus from a sales transaction can be divided
up among the parties in any number of ways. If buyers and sellers have
roughly equal bargaining power over the run of cases, we would expect each
group to garner half the surplus from the sales that occur, settling on prices that
fall on average halfway in between their respective reservation prices. Current
market conditions and future expectations may skew surplus division,
however, which will influence sales prices and hence FMV. Lee is thus correct
to observe that FMV will reflect the gains from trade that sellers can expect to
realize on average.32 Does it then follow that owners who have their property
taken through eminent domain are not deprived of the opportunity to realize
gains from trade?33
There are at least three reasons to resist this conclusion. First, a gain from
trade can only be realized by a condemnee if she actually receives more than
her own reservation price. This may not occur, for the reasons discussed
above.34 However, the earlier discussion also suggests that under some market
conditions, FMV could exceed the reservation prices of some nonsellers, as
where FMV has been driven up by housing scarcity and owners do not respond
quickly to sell their properties. If such a nonseller suffers a condemnation,
FMV would give her an amount in excess of her reservation price. By
definition, this compensation would assign her some of the gains from the
property’s transfer. Whether condemnees as a group receive an “average”
amount of gains from trade, then, depends on whether they tend to receive an
average amount of compensation in excess of their reservation prices, which in
turn depends on the relationship between FMV and their actual subjective
valuations.
Second, even if we were to assume (counterfactually) that every
condemnee receives an amount above her reservation price that equates to her
expected share of the surplus from a negotiated sale, she still loses the chance
to negotiate for a share of the surplus under actual market conditions. On the
assumptions just given, some condemnees will be better off for not having had
to conduct their own negotiations or risk the vagaries of the market, while
some will be worse off. Human optimism being what it is, we would expect
most people to feel aggrieved over missing the chance to bargain for the lion’s
share of the gain from trade under some imagined set of propitious future
market conditions. This particular loss blends into the autonomy concern
31. See, e.g., Garnett, supra note 4, at 109–10.
32. Lee, supra note 1, at 614–15.
33. Lee recognizes that condemnees do not share in the surplus produced by the development
that is the reason for the condemnation. Id. at 615. He suggests that they receive compensation
through the FMV standard for their other expected gains from trade, however. Id. at 614–15.
34. See supra Part I.A.
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considered below, however, insofar as the individual’s inflated view of the
expected value of a hypothetical forgone bargaining opportunity exceeds the
actual expected value of those future bargaining opportunities.
The third point connects subtly to the second. While every owner may
hope to win big in some future unspecified land deal, condemnees may be
deprived of a concrete prospect for negotiating supernormal returns. Where
eminent domain is used as a substitute for a private land assembly that would
have otherwise taken place, the owner loses the chance to bargain over
supplying a valuable input to that assembly. If ownership in general confers a
lottery ticket of sorts (“One day this place may be worth a fortune!”), holding a
very well-positioned property that is essential to an important project can be
analogized to holding a winning lottery ticket.
Some caveats apply. First, it may be unclear whether a given exercise of
eminent domain has crowded out a private land acquisition that otherwise
would have taken place; perhaps the land assembly would not have been
attempted had eminent domain been unavailable. Second, it is impossible to
know whether any particular landowner could have exerted sufficient leverage
to claim a significant portion of the assembly surplus. Nonetheless, owners
whose property is condemned lose any chance that they otherwise would have
had to pursue a share of the gains associated with the project in question, and
do not receive compensation for it through FMV.35 Whether the landowner has
any claim to this surplus is a separate normative question that is taken up
below.
2. Autonomy. — For homeowners, the autonomy to decide whether and
when to sell has two components that are worth separating out for purposes of
this analysis. One element relates to the consumption experience of
homeownership and the value of the option to remain in possession as long as
one likes. From an instrumental perspective, this option provides the
opportunity to sell when (and only when) one’s subjective value in the
property has dropped to a low level, or when strong pull factors are present,
rather than requiring the owner to suffer dispossession at a randomly chosen
time that might match up with neither of these occurrences. Autonomy thus
supports the realization of subjective value through homeownership. It further
assures owners that this subjective value can be realized in kind, through
continued possession, at the owner’s election, providing a form of security that
resists monetization.36
The second facet of autonomy relates to the home as an investment and
the ability to hold that investment for as long as one likes. The option value
associated with ownership relates in part to the discussion above about
pursuing gains from trade, but extends beyond it. Ownership, as Henry Smith
35. Here too, the lost chance to bargain may leave some owners better off. For example, an
owner might have miscalculated the amount of surplus available from a project and insisted on so
much that she caused the project to fail, even though the FMV payout would have met her
reservation price.
36. It is an empirical question how disruptive displacement from the home is, and thus how
significant is an owner’s right to continued possession. See Stephanie M. Stern, Residential
Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of Home, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1093, 1109–19 (2009)
(critiquing assumption that displacement visits serious harms on those who are displaced).
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has argued, delegates to owners the right to pursue a wide range of projects on
their holdings.37 That these projects may have a variety of time horizons
presents no difficulty; an owner can hold onto the property until the
investments pay off, or until she decides to give up on them. Ownership
supports the owner’s agency, then, and does so in ways that are independent of
the expected value that the owner might glean from the property. As an
institution, it lets owners hope and strive for more than the average returns for
a property of a given type. It gives them the freedom to fail as well as to
succeed in their efforts.
Eminent domain eliminates these sources of security and agency. The
FMV measure does not (and could not) compensate for these losses. But,
significantly, this observation is merely a positive fact and not a normative
conclusion. To say that autonomy is not compensated by the FMV standard
does not, on its own, establish that there is any normative problem requiring
intervention. More broadly, the idea of “the uncompensated increment” does
not lead ineluctably to an insistence that all elements of ownership be fully
compensated. Instead, it can be used to structure an inquiry into which
exercises of eminent domain are normatively consistent with leaving such
increments uncompensated.38 That inquiry finds much common ground with
Lee’s normative analysis, as the next Part explains.
II. IS FAIR MARKET VALUE JUST ENOUGH?
Lee follows his examination of the contents of FMV with a set of
normative arguments. He draws two conclusions. First, with respect to
subjective value and gains from trade, FMV compensation is sufficiently just.
Second, with respect to autonomy values, FMV falls short in a way that should
be remedied not through a percentage premium above FMV, but rather through
per capita lump sums. This Part considers each claim in turn.
A. Eccentrics and Opportunists
Lee’s positive arguments suggest that typical amounts of both subjective
value and gains from trade are built into the FMV standard. His normative
argument is that the portions omitted do not present a problem from the
perspective of fairness. Consider first subjective value, which, on Lee’s
account, is only left out of FMV to the extent it is idiosyncratically large. If
this is so, his analysis suggests, compensation only falls short for eccentric
owners whose preferences the property system would be foolhardy to take into

37. Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1719, 1728, 1754–55
(2004); see also Larissa Katz, Spite and Extortion: A Jurisdictional Principle of Abuse of Property
Right, 122 Yale L.J. 1444, 1480–82 (2013) (discussing extent of, and limits on, delegation to
owners).
38. See, e.g., Fennell, Taking, supra note 6, at 982 (posing question of “whether the confiscation
of the uncompensated increment is a taking for which just compensation is required” (emphasis
omitted)).

2013]

JUST ENOUGH

119

account. We have a society to run after all, and taking extreme valuations into
account would gum up the works.39
Like eccentrics, presumed opportunists receive no quarter from Lee. He
argues that only the special opportunity to reap gains from the project that is
the basis of the condemnation itself is omitted from FMV, and fairly so. If no
one has a right to any of the surplus that a condemnation assembly will
produce, then nothing has been taken away when FMV fails to compensate for
this element. Lee observes that the whole point of eminent domain is to get
around exactly the sort of holdout problem that would result if people were
allowed to bargain for surplus in such contexts, making it inconsistent to take
such bargaining leverage into account in compensation.40
It is not hard to agree with the tenor of Lee’s normative conclusions. It is
entirely sensible to provide a measure of eminent domain compensation that
omits some elements of value. One reason for doing so relates to the nature of
eminent domain and the benefits that it confers on owners. Richard Epstein has
used the term “implicit in-kind compensation” to refer to societal benefits that
condemnees receive back as a result of takings.41 Because these benefits can
stand in for monetary compensation, the payment of FMV need not make
condemnees whole on its own.42 An extension of this argument would posit the
following hypothetical bargain: In exchange for living in a society where
certain collective goods and services can be feasibly provided, landowners
agree to give up some of ownership’s prerogatives in the event their property is
needed as an input into those goods or services.43

39. See Lee, supra note 1, at 629–32 (arguing that individuals with large idiosyncratic premia
should not be allowed to block beneficial public projects). Lee appears to soften this stance
somewhat when it comes to the sentimental value subcomponent of subjective value. See id. at
633–34 & n.125.
40. Id. at 620–25; see also id. at 633 (expressing concern that demands for shares of surplus by
condemnees “could make low-margin beneficial projects infeasible, with a resulting net cost to
social welfare”).
41. Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain 195–215
(1985).
42. See id. at 195 (“The Constitution speaks only of ‘just’ compensation, not of the form it must
take.”).
43. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94
Cornell L. Rev. (Special Issue) 745, 775–79 (2009) (examining obligations of ownership in
context of eminent domain); Krier & Serkin, supra note 7, at 866–67 (observing “classic public
uses” provide in-kind compensation by delivering benefits to public at large). Epstein’s
endorsement of in-kind compensation would not go as far as the position outlined in the text. See
Epstein, supra note 41, at 196–97 (deeming compensation to be just only if it leaves each party at
least as well off as before government action). If one considers each condemnation in isolation, it
likely leaves actual condemnees worse off ex post. See, e.g., Alexander, supra, at 776–77 (noting
eminent domain contains “an element of individual sacrifice” because “[i]ts effects are
necessarily concentrated on those whose property is condemned”); Krier & Serkin, supra note 7,
at 866 (conceding “condemnees are still worse off relative to all the rest of the public who realize
the benefits of the same government project but retain their property as well,” although “[o]ver
time . . . imbalances should even out”); see also Lynn E. Blais, Takings, Statutes, and the
Common Law: Considering Inherent Limitations on Title, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 42 (1996)
(contrasting ex ante vision of reciprocity of advantage with Epstein’s view).
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Scholars who pay attention to uncompensated costs are not necessarily
bent on fully compensating them in each instance. Instead, these factors help to
show why expanding the range of eminent domain beyond the terms of the
hypothesized bargain might create difficulties.44 For better or worse, ownership
does generally entail the right to be an eccentric, or an opportunist,45 or even
an eccentric opportunist. Eminent domain represents a carve-out from that
general rule, and thus bears a burden of justification—although not necessarily
a burden of perfect compensation. This point is especially important given the
difficulty of compensating for compromised autonomy, as the next section
discusses.
B. Compensating for Lost Autonomy
One element that Lee agrees is systematically omitted from FMV
compensation is the autonomy interest associated with choosing when (and
whether) to sell.46 He argues that any eminent domain reform that attempts to
target undercompensation should start by asking what sort of remedy would be
well-suited to this particular shortfall. Plans that increase compensation for
eminent domain by some percentage markup serve as a foil for Lee’s
analysis.47 His proposed alternative begins with the premise that respect for
autonomy is owed to each person, without regard to the value of her dwelling
unit. He argues that compensation should therefore be awarded on a per capita
rather than percentage basis.48 There is much to be said for this approach, but it
is also subject to some critiques.

44. For example, if eminent domain is regularly wielded on behalf of powerful private parties
against less powerful individuals, the reciprocity implicit in the hypothetical ex ante bargain
referenced above will not be present. See Alexander, supra note 43, at 777.
45. I use the word “opportunist” in a limited sense to refer to the right that property rule
protection confers on owners to hold out in an attempt to extract more surplus from the other
party. Whether and to what extent the institution of property builds in limits on the use of
leverage is open to question. See e.g., Katz, supra note 37, at 1458–68 (attempting to differentiate
“legitimate leverage” from “illegitimate leverage”).
46. Of course, owners are only able to sell at a time of their own choosing if they can find willing
buyers. In some cases, the government’s role as a potential buyer could expand rather than
contract the choice set available to owners—as where the exercise of eminent domain happens to
coincide with the owner’s own preferred time of sale.
47. See Lee, supra note 1, at 634–35 (discussing proposed and enacted percentage bonus
provisions). Such approaches have not infrequently been criticized. See, e.g., Fennell, Taking,
supra note 6, at 993–94 (noting percentage-based approach might undercompensate or
overcompensate, while failing to respond to autonomy concerns); Rachel D. Godsil & David V.
Simunovich, Protecting Status: The Mortgage Crisis, Eminent Domain, and the Ethic of
Homeownership, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 949, 978 (2008) (“[T]he application of the [percentage
premium plan] exacerbates the wealth disparity at taxpayer expense.”); Merrill, supra note 7, at
92 (suggesting windfalls created by percentage premium approaches could spur rent-seeking
behavior designed to attract eminent domain); Jeffrey Evans Stake, Just (and Efficient?)
Compensation for Governmental Expropriations, in Law, Mind, and Brain 299, 314 (Michael
Freeman & Oliver Goodenough eds., 2009) (observing “a simple multiplier for duration of
possession might be unfair” because it would treat differently losses of poor and rich owners).
48. See Lee, supra note 1, at 645 (“[B]ecause all people are moral equals, their autonomy has
equal value, so any compensation provided specifically for the loss of autonomy should not
depend upon the market value of the recipient’s property . . . .”).

2013]

JUST ENOUGH

121

First, it is unclear how well Lee’s proposal aligns with its internal logic. If
displacement of individual people is the problem, then renters as well as
homeowners should be compensated49—and this is likely what Lee has in
mind.50 But the fact that different sets of people may own and occupy the
property raises a conceptual difficulty. As suggested above, there are two
different types of autonomy interest with which eminent domain might
interfere—one that relates to the option to retain physical possession, and one
that relates to the option to hold the property as an investment as long as one
likes. Only owners are deprived of the latter form of autonomy, while they may
or may not be deprived of the former (depending on whether they occupy the
property themselves). To the extent that compensation for autonomy is
contemplated, payments must be sensitive to the differences between the
interests affected by each of these types of incursions.51
At a broader level, Lee’s compensation proposal seems to overstep what
is necessary from a normative perspective, insofar as it disregards the notion of
implicit in-kind compensation.52 If it is viewed as unobjectionable to leave
some prerogatives of ownership uncompensated in order to achieve society’s
objectives, why must an interference with autonomy always be redressed? The
question (which the public use clause might be thought to address) is whether
the exercise of eminent domain fits within a category for which these
incursions have already been compensated in kind. Where this is not the case,
all of the uncompensated elements become an issue; where the condition is
satisfied, none requires special attention.
CONCLUSION
Fair market value compensation is not full compensation. Lee’s analysis
does not undercut that basic fact, though it does helpfully push us to examine
the nature and extent of the undercompensation a fair market value standard
generates. Nonetheless, the constitutional standard for just compensation may
well be “just enough.” In this Response, I have tried to both illuminate and
challenge certain aspects of the path Lee takes in reaching and qualifying this
conclusion. Whether or not one agrees with Lee’s conclusions, the questions
49. See Stake, supra note 47, at 314 (arguing “compensation ought to be awarded to every
displaced member of the household with sufficient tenure to form ties to social networks and
physical structures”—including family members and tenants).
50. Lee does not explicitly mention tenants, but instead refers to a “fixed-dollar-amount
compensation bonus to each condemnee.” Lee, supra note 1, at 645 (emphasis omitted). His later
discussion of compensation for sentimental value refers to “each resident.” Id. at 648 (emphasis
omitted).
51. A deeper issue, which Lee addresses at length, is whether money can even compensate for
lost autonomy. Id. at 639–45. My view remains that it cannot, although the public use clause can
be understood as marking out the conditions under which interference with an owner’s autonomy
is permissible. Where public use is unclear, a voluntary self-assessment approach could offer a
way to address autonomy concerns—not by putting a price on autonomy, but rather by allowing
owners to exercise autonomy. See Fennell, Taking, supra note 6, at 995 (“The core idea is to
overcome the incommensurability difficulty associated with autonomy interests by eliciting
advance consent from landowners to takings that would go to private transferees under
circumstances where public use is unclear.”).
52. See supra text accompanying notes 41–43.
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that he thoughtfully brings to the forefront can be expected to fuel future work
on eminent domain.
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